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In re Hydrogen Peroxide: Reinforcing Rigorous Analysis 
for Class Action Certification 
Sarah Rajski† 
“[D]enying or granting class certification is often the defining mo-
ment in class actions (for it may sound the ‘death knell’ of the liti-
gation on the part of plaintiffs, or create unwarranted pressure to 
settle nonmeritorious claims on the part of defendants).”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite district courts defining their own, and often conflicting, 
standards for evaluating class certification motions, the Supreme Court 
has remained silent on the question of what facts plaintiffs must show in 
support of a motion for class action certification.2  Initially, the Supreme 
Court noted that “nothing in . . . [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP) 23] gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry 
into the merits of a suit . . . to determine whether it may be maintained as 
a class action.” 3  Later, the Supreme Court somewhat clarified its posi-
tion, stating that a “[c]lass action[] may only be certified if the trial court 
is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) 
have been satisfied.”4  To complete such a rigorous analysis, the Court 
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 1. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig. (Hydrogen Peroxide II), 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 
2008) (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 
2001)). 
 2. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig. (In re IPO), 471 F.3d 24, 33−34 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 3. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177−78 (1974).  But see Coopers & Lybrand v. 
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978) (“[C]lass determination generally involves considerations that are 
‘enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action.’”  (quoting Mer-
cantile Nat’l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963))); Livesay, 437 U.S. at 469 n.12 (“The 
more complex determinations . . . entail even greater entanglement with the merits.” (quoting 15 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3911, 485 n.45 (1976))). 
 4. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) (emphasis added). 
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continued, it “may be necessary for the court to probe behind the plead-
ings.”5  But the Supreme Court has failed to provide any further guidance 
of what constitutes such a rigorous analysis and the role a court must 
take in responding to conflicting expert testimony.6 
Recently, the Third Circuit announced a clearly defined rigorous 
analysis standard for class certification in In re Hydrogen Peroxide Anti-
trust Litigation (In re Hydrogen).7  This standard, outlining a court’s role 
and involvement, should be adopted by the Supreme Court.  In reversing 
certification of a massive class action based on the absence of sufficient 
proof, the In re Hydrogen court held that a lower court has not conducted 
a rigorous analysis without inquiring into and resolving whether the re-
quirements for class certification were met.8  “Only upon a consideration 
of the elements underpinning [a plaintiff’s] . . . claims” can a court de-
termine whether the FRCP 23 requirements for a class action have been 
satisfied.9  The In re Hydrogen court’s application is just one example 
that illustrates the continuing struggle among courts addressing the re-
quirements of class certification.10 
While previous decisions have supported the need for a court to 
conduct a thorough examination of each FRCP 23 requirement, only In 
re Hydrogen held that a court should address and resolve any conflicting 
evidence as to whether the requirements have been satisfied.11  Moreo-
ver, in clearly defining this rigorous analysis standard, the Third Circuit 
in In re Hydrogen concluded that a court should also evaluate the admis-
sibility of expert testimony when determining whether the plaintiff can 
meet FRCP 23 requirements for class certification, even if it leads to 
threshold determinations about the credibility of competing expert opi-
nions.12 
In In re Hydrogen, direct purchasers of hydrogen peroxide and oth-
er chemicals brought an antitrust class action suit against various chemi-
cal manufacturers claiming a conspiracy of price-fixing spanning several 
                                                 
 5. Id. at 160. 
 6. See In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 33−34. 
 7. See Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Principal Brief for Radioshack Corp. Following Order Granting Permission to Appeal 
(F.R.C.P. 23(f)) at 40, Kamar v. Radioshack Corp., No. 09-55674 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2010) (discuss-
ing Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 311). 
 10. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 307; see, e.g., In re IPO, 471 F.3d 24, 39–40 (2d Cir. 
2006); West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002); Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 
474 F.3d 1214, 1224–25 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 11. Jeffrey S. Klein et al., Courts Must Resolve “Battle of the Experts” Before Class Certifica-
tion, N.Y. L.J., (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=9558. 
 12. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 323. 
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years.13  After extensive discovery, the plaintiffs moved to certify the suit 
as a class action.14  Despite conflicting expert testimony presented by 
both sides regarding the class certification requirements, mainly concern-
ing the predominance requirement—whether the issues common to the 
class predominated over individual issues—the district court certified the 
class.15  The defendants then appealed the class certification order, ar-
guing that the district court erred by failing to meaningfully consider the 
defendants’ expert, applying too lenient of a standard of proof to the 
plaintiffs’ expert, and inferring a presumption of impact.16  The Third 
Circuit agreed that the district court failed to adequately consider expert 
testimony and applied too lenient a proof standard in evaluating the pre-
dominance requirement; the court then vacated and remanded the class 
certification order.17 
In vacating the class certification order, the Third Circuit clarified 
three key aspects that courts within its circuit must apply when consider-
ing class certification motions.18  First, a court must consider all relevant 
evidence and arguments, including expert testimony offered by either 
party.19  While this may result in a “battle of the experts” to decide class 
certification, the Third Circuit emphasized that conflicting expert testi-
mony, like the other requirements under FRCP 23, must be subject to a 
rigorous analysis.20  Therefore, a court must resolve any relevant and 
possibly conflicting expert testimony at the certification stage.21 
Second, decisions to certify a class action require more than a mere 
“threshold showing” that each FRCP 23 requirement is met.22  Rather, 
factual determinations supporting each requirement must be based on a 
preponderance of the evidence.23  The Third Circuit requires more than 
an “intention” to satisfy the procedural requirements: each FRCP 23 re-
quirement must be met, “not just supported by some evidence.”24 
                                                 
 13. Id. at 307–08. 
 14. Id. at 308. 
 15. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig. (In re Hydrogen), 240 F.R.D. 163, 167 (E.D. Pa. 
2007). 
 16. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 312. 
 17. Id. at 325–27.  The court of appeals held that the district court applied an improperly le-
nient proof standard and that the district court failed to adequately consider the opinion of the manu-
facturer’s expert economist.  Id. at 323–24. 
 18. Id. at 307. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 323. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 307. 
 23. Id.  While the Third Circuit’s “preponderance of evidence” requirement involves a higher 
showing by the plaintiff, this Comment will not focus exclusively on the burden of proof require-
ment at the precertification stage. 
 24. Id. at 321 (quoting In re IPO, 471 F.3d 24, 33 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
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Finally, a court must resolve all factual and legal disputes relevant 
to class certification, even if these disputes overlap with the merits of the 
claim.25   As noted by the Third Circuit, prior to In re Hydrogen a num-
ber of district courts applied a rigorous analysis including preliminary 
inquiry into the resolution of conflicting expert testimony as necessary to 
evaluate a FRCP 23 requirement.26  But some courts declined to apply 
this analysis because of concern for the potential overlap with the merits 
of the plaintiffs’ claim.  Yet a court must first determine the legal ele-
ments of the plaintiffs’ claim before it can determine whether the re-
quirements of FRCP 23 have been met.27  Therefore, in conducting a ri-
gorous analysis, a court must make at least a preliminary decision on the 
merits of a case by applying the alleged facts to the legal elements, which 
requires more than a court’s determination of whether a legal element of 
the plaintiffs’ claim is satisfied.28 
Although binding only in the Third Circuit, In re Hydrogen has the 
potential to substantially assist other circuit courts and the class certifica-
tion process in general.  The majority opinion was written by Chief 
Judge Anthony J. Scirica, a leading civil procedure scholar, who sets 
forth a persuasive argument for courts to take a heightened role in pro-
moting efficient use of the legal system and curbing potential abuse of 
class actions.29  The Third Circuit provides a clear and concise rigorous 
analysis standard for class certification that can easily serve as guidance 
for the circuits, in contrast to the Supreme Court’s vague assertions and 
repeated avoidance of core FRCP 23 requirements for class certifica-
tion.30  In light of the current circuit split regarding class certification 
requirements and the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate a clear stan-
dard for rigorous analysis, Supreme Court involvement is clearly needed 
to address the issue of a court’s involvement and to adopt a reinforced 
rigorous analysis standard prior to class certification. 
This Comment explores the reasons why the Third Circuit’s high 
rigorous analysis standard, which increases a district court’s role in the 
class certification process, should be reviewed and adopted by the Su-
                                                 
 25. Id. at 307. 
 26. See, e.g., In re IPO, 471 F.3d 24, 42 (2d Cir. 2006); West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 
935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 27. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 311; see also Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562, 1564 
(11th Cir. 1984). 
 28. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 22, Kamar v. Radioshack Corp., No. 09-55674 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 
2010). 
 29. Klein et al., supra note 11. 
 30. Year-End Update on Class Actions: Explosive Growth in Class Actions Continues Despite 
Mounting Obstacles to Certification, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER L.L.P. PUBL’NS, Feb. 
10, 2009, http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/Year-EndUpdateOnClass 
Actions.aspx. 
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preme Court.  Part II contains an overview of the history of class actions, 
the class certification process, and the procedural requirements under 
FRCP 23.  Part III analyzes the Third Circuit’s rigorous analysis standard 
for certification of a class action and discusses the three standards that 
district courts must apply when considering class certification motions.  
Part IV explores other relevant federal court class certification decisions, 
examines the principal case at odds with the Third Circuit (the Ninth Cir-
cuit case Dukes v. Wal-Mart), and explains the need for further Supreme 
Court clarification.  Part IV also explains why Supreme Court involve-
ment is needed to resolve this class certification issue and why the Court 
should adopt the In re Hydrogen rigorous analysis standard.  Part V 
summarizes this Comment and argues in support of a high rigorous anal-
ysis standard for class certification.  Part VI concludes. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 
A.  History of Class Actions 
A “class action” is a lawsuit in which a group of people with the 
same or similar injuries caused by a product, action, or omission sue as a 
group.31  The action can be brought by one or more individuals on behalf 
of the larger group or the “class.”32  Because many of the individuals’ 
same or similar injuries may be minor, providing little incentive to pur-
sue legal redress on their own, the value of consolidated claims can be 
more attractive than individual lawsuits.33  Moreover, the “promotion of 
efficiency and economy of litigation” are well-established as the most 
important benefits and goals of a class action suit.34 
Class action suits have been popular judicial remedies because they 
are viable options for plaintiffs to seek redress.  Although class actions 
became widely available with the promulgation of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in 1938 and the enactment of FRCP 23, the use of class 
actions in various legal arenas has expanded over the years.35  More re-
cently, plaintiffs’ attorneys have found an incentive to file class actions 
because of the potential for multimillion-dollar judgments or settlements 
                                                 
 31. Class Action Cases, FINDLAW.COM, http://public.findlaw.com/library/legal-system/class-
action-cases.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2010). 
 32. ROBERT H. KLONOFF, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION IN A 
NUTSHELL 15 (2d ed. 2004). 
 33. Id. at 11–12; Class Action Cases, supra note 31. 
 34. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 349 (1983) (discussing Ameri-
can Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974)). 
 35. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940). 
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resulting in large attorney-fee awards that accompany such judgments.36  
In connection with the popular class action trend, courts have viewed 
their role in managing and monitoring class action suits as an affirmative 
function, not only in evaluating class certification but also in administer-
ing the litigation once a class has been certified.37  A court’s increased 
involvement causes it to evaluate and resolve any conflicts at the precer-
tification stage, which directly corresponds to how much a plaintiff must 
demonstrate to meet the FRCP 23 requirements for class certification.38 
The federal government also recognized the courts’ heightened role 
in class action cases when President George W. Bush signed the Class 
Action Fairness Act (the Act) on February 18, 2005.39  In support of an 
active court, the Act directs courts to give greater scrutiny to class action 
settlements and to limit fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys.40  In addition, the 
Act offers greater protection to individual class members, such as con-
sumer protection provisions, which incorporates the idea that justice may 
not be served in all class action suits if individuals are not appropriately 
compensated for their injuries.41  While protecting individual class mem-
bers, the Act seeks to prevent plaintiffs of class actions from having un-
fair bargaining power to force a settlement.42  While class action lawsuits 
can help numerous plaintiffs obtain relief for harms that affected a large 
group of people who would not otherwise recover, they also run the risk 
of abuse by attorneys seeking multimillion-dollar settlements or attorney 
fees.  Therefore, the tension among these conflicting interests supports 
the need for an active court to evaluate the appropriate litigation structure 
and then to manage such suits, if certified. 
B.  FRCP 23 Requirements and Criteria 
Recognizing the effectiveness of class action lawsuits, courts have 
permitted the use of class actions in various substantive legal areas, such 
as defective products, fraud, corporate misconduct, and employment 
                                                 
 36. LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C., THE NATIONAL EMPLOYER–2009/2010 EDITION 671 (2009) 
(on file with author). 
 37. Id. at 673. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 40. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1712–14 (2006).  The Act also provides for federal jurisdiction over certain 
state law class actions.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006). 
 41. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1712–14. 
 42. Class Action Fairness Act, § 2.  The Act also recognizes the efficient and valuable purpose 
served by a class action structure—one of the goals is to provide both plaintiffs and defendants 
broader access to federal courts.  Id. 
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practices.43  But FRCP 23 requires courts to take multiple steps under 
subsections (a) and (b) for a case to be certified as a class action.44 
In order for a class action to be certified under FRCP 23, four crite-
ria must initially be met under subsection (a).45  First, FRCP 23 requires 
numerosity: the proposed class size must be so “numerous that joinder of 
all members is impracticable.”46  Second, commonality of questions of 
law and fact must exist.47  Under the commonality requirement, there 
must be “questions of law or fact common to the class,”48 and these is-
sues are such that the “resolution of [them] will advance the litigation.”49  
Third, FRCP 23 requires typicality: the “claims or defenses of the repre-
sentative parties” must be “typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class.”50  Fourth, FRCP 23 requires adequacy of representation: a deter-
mination that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately pro-
tect the interests of the class.”51 
Once these criteria are satisfied, the plaintiff must also satisfy one 
of the three categories of FRCP 23(b) in order for the suit to be certified 
as a class action.52  The three categories include: (1) the risk of inconsis-
tent or impaired adjudication; (2) action by the defendant on grounds 
generally applicable to the class; and (3) common questions of law or 
fact predominate and class resolution is superior to other available me-
thods.53 
The requirements of FRCP 23 are fact heavy, which results in 
courts having to examine evidence in order to determine whether a class 
should be certified.54  But FRCP 23 is silent on which evidence the plain-
tiffs must show in order to meet the FRCP 23 requirements,55 and the 
                                                 
 43. KLONOFF, supra note 32, at 9–10; see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940) (not-
ing that class actions did not originate with the adoption of the Federal Rules, but were an “invention 
of equity to enable it to proceed to a decree in suits where the number of those interested in the sub-
ject of the litigation is so great that their joinder as parties in conformity to the usual rules of proce-
dure is impracticable”). 
 44. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 45. Id. at 23(a). 
 46. Id. at 23(a)(1); see Paxton v. Union Nat’l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 559–60 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 47. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); see Harris v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 127 F.R.D. 655, 661 (N.D. Ill. 
1989). 
 48. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
 49. Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 50. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3); see Sprague, 133 F.3d at 399. 
 51. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4); see Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512 
(9th Cir. 1978). 
 52. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes on 1966 
amendments. 
 53. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A)–(B), (b)(2).  Discussion of the various 
elements for each of these categories is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 54. In re IPO, 471 F.3d 24, 40 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 55. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
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Supreme Court has yet to clarify the matter.56  Through rigorous analysis, 
the court must ensure a continuing balance between protecting plaintiffs’ 
access to the courts and protecting defendants from forced settlements 
upon class action certification. 
C.  The Use of Expert Testimony During the Certification Stage 
Both the party seeking class certification and the party opposing 
certification often present expert testimony regarding whether the various 
FRCP 23 requirements have been met.57  Lower courts have struggled 
with the limited and sometimes conflicting Supreme Court guidance on 
how to address the FRCP 23 requirements—especially regarding con-
flicting expert testimony.58  Part of this confusion stems from the 
FRCP 23 requirements; for instance, “whether common or individualized 
issues predominate can only be made in reference to the legal elements 
of the claims.”59  FRCP 23 requires the court to look for commonalities 
between the plaintiffs’ claims to determine whether the suit can be certi-
fied as a class action.60  Therefore, when a court is looking at the com-
monalities of the plaintiffs’ claims, it must look at the legal elements of 
those claims.  These legal elements are often supported by expert testi-
mony.  As a result, the court must determine the credibility of the expert 
testimony before certifying the class action. 
Although it appears that the court’s review of the elements of a 
claim would unavoidably involve the merits of the case, the court is not 
asked to decide the merits at this stage but, more narrowly, to determine 
whether the plaintiffs’ claims support the FRCP 23 requirements.  In the 
past, many courts refused to make credibility determinations about com-
peting experts’ opinions at the class certification stage.61  Yet it appears 
appellate courts have started to resist such a laissez-faire approach and 
have more recently required lower courts to evaluate and weigh expert 
testimony during the class certification stage, even if weighing the testi-
mony leads the court to make “threshold determination[s]” about the cre-
dibility of conflicting expert testimony.62 
As noted previously, the Supreme Court has failed to provide any 
guidance on what constitutes a rigorous analysis or the role the court 
                                                 
 56. See In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 33 n.4. 
 57. Margaret Lyle & Andrew Wirmani, Courts Deciding Class Certification Must Resolve 
“Dueling” Expert Testimony, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.abanet.org/litigation/committees/ 
classactions/class-certification-expert-testimony.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 28, at 22. 
 60. See Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 61. Lyle & Wirmani, supra note 57. 
 62. Lyle & Wirmani, supra note 57. 
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must take in deciding conflicting expert testimony.63  In light of this lack 
of direction from the Supreme Court, district courts have struggled with 
the extent of their role during the precertification process.64  Since expert 
testimony may focus on almost every element of the plaintiffs’ claim, 
from commonality and predominance to proof and damages, clear guid-
ance on how a court should evaluate expert testimony for certification 
purposes is necessary.  The Third Circuit’s articulation of a clear rigor-
ous analysis standard in In re Hydrogen is an appropriate response to the 
struggles of the district courts and further supports the need for Supreme 
Court involvement and guidance in the class certification process.65 
D.  Approaches to Evaluating Expert Testimony 
In evaluating expert testimony at the class certification stage, dis-
trict courts often take one of two approaches.  The first approach is to 
allow the expert testimony as long as it is not “fatally flawed.”66  In fol-
lowing this approach, many district courts decline to consider whether 
the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or whether the plaintiffs would 
prevail on the merits of the action.67  Rather, district courts determine 
“whether [plaintiffs have] shown, based on a methodology that [is] not 
fatally flawed, that the requirements of [FRCP] 23 were met.”68  Courts 
often refer to this approach as the “some showing” standard, stating that 
the “showing may take the form of, for example, expert opinions, evi-
dence (by document, affidavit, live testimony, or otherwise), or the un-
contested allegations of the complaint.”69  Imposing such a low threshold 
requirement on plaintiffs’ presentation of expert testimony gives plain-
tiffs greater bargaining power in settlement negotiations because the suit 
is more likely to be certified as a class action under such a lenient ap-
proach. 
                                                 
 63. In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 30–33 n.4. 
 64. Kenneth Ewing, Hydrogen Peroxide: The Crest of the Wave, 5 CPI ANTITRUST 
CHRONICLE (May 14, 2009), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/emhydrogen-
peroxide-em-the-crest-of-the-wave. 
 65. This Comment does not focus on whether the circuit split may be resolved through further 
rulemaking or legislative action, especially in light of the recent Dukes v. Wal-Mart petition for 
certiorari.  Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 
3128 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-277). 
 66. In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig. (Visa Check), 280 F.3d 124, 134–35 (2d 
Cir. 2001); see In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 42. 
 67. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1974) (“The question is not whether 
the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather, wheth-
er the requirements of Rule 23 are met.”). 
 68. Visa Check, 280 F.3d at 135; see In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 36–38. 
 69. In re Initial Pub. Offering Secs. Litig., 227 F.R.D. 65, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see Caridad v. 
Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 292 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Visa Check, 280 F.3d at 
134–35. 
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The second approach courts use to evaluate expert testimony is de-
rived from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.70  The stan-
dard announced by the Daubert Court was applied pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702, which permits an expert to testify “if scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”71  A trial judge 
then acts as a “gatekeeper” and must “ensure that any and all scientific 
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”72  
Therefore, the expert testimony must rest “on a reliable foundation” and 
be “relevant to the task at hand” in order to be admitted.73  While Dau-
bert requires more of a plaintiff in presenting expert testimony, it does 
not provide courts specific guidance on how to evaluate reliable, yet con-
flicting, expert testimony at the class certification stage. 
Although both approaches are valuable tools for courts to use in 
evaluating and resolving conflicting expert testimony, these approaches 
are seldom used in this manner.  Lower courts have permitted conflicting 
expert testimony to help satisfy class certification requirements as long 
as the testimony has met one of the two standards.  As set forth by the 
Third Circuit in In re Hydrogen, rigorous analysis requires courts to take 
their evaluation of expert testimony one step further by tying the infor-
mation provided by the expert back to the legal elements of the plaintiffs’ 
claims for class certification.74  In so holding, the Third Circuit asserts 
that when a court fails to examine the elements of the claim going to 
each FRCP 23 requirement, the court circumvents the rigorous analysis 
required and fails to meet its duty at the class certification stage.75 
III.  HISTORY OF IN RE HYDROGEN PEROXIDE 
The Supreme Court previously explained that a district court must 
conduct a rigorous analysis of the moving party’s claims to determine 
whether the requirements of FRCP 23 can be established.76  The Third 
Circuit’s decision in In re Hydrogen helps define the “rigorous analysis” 
standard. 
                                                 
 70. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). 
 71. Id. at 588 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702). 
 72. Id. at 589. 
 73. Id. at 597; see also FED. R. EVID. 702.  Hence, if the expert testimony is irrelevant or unre-
liable, it must be excluded. 
 74. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d 305, 324 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 147 (1982) (holding the district court 
erred in permitting plaintiff to maintain a failure-to-hire employment class action without any specif-
ic presentation identifying the questions of law or fact that were common to claims of employee and 
of class members the plaintiff sought to represent). 
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A.  The District Court’s Holding: Intent to Prove 
The reasoning of the Third Circuit’s announcement of a clear rigor-
ous analysis standard cannot be fully appreciated without an understand-
ing of the underlying nature of In re Hydrogen.  On January 31, 2005, 
direct purchasers of hydrogen peroxide and related chemicals brought an 
antitrust action against eighteen hydrogen peroxide manufacturers, alleg-
ing a price-fixing conspiracy over eleven years.77  After an investigation 
of possible violations of antitrust law in the hydrogen peroxide industry, 
multiple class action filings followed.78  The district court consolidated 
the cases, resulting in the direct purchaser action where plaintiffs re-
quested to be certified as a class action.79 
Pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(3), plaintiffs claimed that “questions of 
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to 
other available methods for . . . adjudicating the controversy.”80  As part 
of the plaintiffs’ antitrust violation claims, every class member was re-
quired to prove at least some antitrust impact resulting from the alleged 
violation.81  The court reasoned that “[i]f proof of the essential elements 
of the cause of action requires individual treatment, then class certifica-
tion is unsuitable.”82 
The district court found that the plaintiffs satisfied the FRCP 23 re-
quirements for class certification.83  The district court noted that at the 
class certification stage, the plaintiffs’ burden is not to prove the ele-
ments of antitrust impact, but rather to demonstrate that the elements are 
                                                 
 77. In re Hydrogen, 240 F.R.D. 163, 166–67 (E.D. Pa. 2007).  Hydrogen peroxide, an inorgan-
ic liquid, is available in solutions of different concentrations and grades depending on its use.  While 
all the defendants sold the standard-grade concentration, not all defendants sold all the other availa-
ble concentration grades in the same amounts.  Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 307. 
 78. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 308. 
 79. In re Hydrogen, 240 F.R.D. at 167.  Upon transfer to the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the court consolidated and divided the cases.  Id. 
 80. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).  Predominance and superiority are the dual requirements of FRCP 
23(b)(3).  Therefore, a class action may be maintained when the questions common to the class 
predominate over the questions affecting individual members.  Predominance “tests whether pro-
posed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.”  Hydrogen Perox-
ide II, 552 F.3d at 310–11 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997)). 
 81. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 311; see also Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 
454 (3d Cir. 1977).  The impact element in antitrust cases is often critically important for “evaluating 
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement because it . . . may call for individual, as opposed to 
common, proof.”  Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 311; see also In re New Motor Vehicles Cana-
dian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 82. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 311 (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 166 (3d Cir. 2001)).  If damages cannot be established through proof 
common to the class, but only to individual class members, then the predominance requirement is 
not met.  Id. 
 83. In re Hydrogen, 240 F.R.D. at 177. 
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capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class 
rather than individual members.84  Therefore, the key issues at this pre-
certification stage include the district court’s “assessment of the available 
evidence and the [method(s)] by which [the] plaintiffs propose to use the 
evidence to prove [their claims] at trial.”85 
1.  Conflicting Expert Testimony 
The conflicting expert testimony presented in In re Hydrogen fo-
cused on two contentious points: (1) evidence of common proof and (2) 
proof of damages.86  The plaintiffs offered the expert opinion and testi-
mony of economist John C. Beyer, Ph.D.87  The defendants offered the 
expert opinion of their own economist, Janusz A. Ordover, Ph.D., who 
disputed many of Dr. Beyer’s opinions regarding the alleged conspiracy 
claim.88 
For the first issue of common proof, the plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Bey-
er, claimed that “there is common proof that can be used to demonstrate 
that the alleged conspiracy to raise prices, restrict output, and allocate 
customers would have impacted all purchasers of hydrogen perox-
ide . . . .”89  A “market analysis,” according to Dr. Beyer, “suggested that 
conditions in the hydrogen peroxide industry favored a conspiracy that 
would have impacted the entire class.”90  In response, the defendants ar-
gued that the plaintiffs failed to provide proof of damages or impact us-
ing evidence common to potential class members.91  Dr. Ordover directly 
questioned whether a “formulaic approach exist[ed] by which impact 
could be demonstrated and damages to the class could be reasonably cal-
culated.”92 
In support of the plaintiffs’ contention that the conspiracy would 
have impacted the entire class, Dr. Beyer set out four main arguments.93  
First, he asserted that hydrogen peroxide and related chemicals are 
                                                 
 84. Id. at 174. 
 85. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 312. 
 86. Id. at 312–13. 
 87. Id. at 312. 
 88. Id. at 313. 
 89. Id. at 312. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 314.  The defendants’ argument focused on FRCP 23(b)(3)’s requirement that ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class members predominate and that the proposed class action be 
superior to other available methods.  Id. at 310–11. 
 92. Id. at 313. 
 93. Id. at 312–13.  As discussed above, impact is often important for the purposes of the pre-
dominance requirement because it may call for individual, as opposed to common, proof.  Id. at 311; 
see also In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2008). 
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“fungible, undifferentiated commodity products.”94  Second, Dr. Beyer 
stated that hydrogen peroxide “production is heavily concentrated in a 
small group of manufacturers.”95  Third, he argued that the “high barriers 
[of] entry in[to] the industry and no close economic substitutes[] pre-
vent[ed] . . . competitors from entering the market[] and undercutting 
prices.”96  Finally, according to Dr. Beyer, the manufacturers’ markets 
“overlapped, so that purchasers would have benefitted from price compe-
tition if not for the alleged conspiracy.”97  Dr. Beyer also contended that 
a “pricing structure” in the hydrogen peroxide industry existed, which 
further suggested a “conspiracy [that] would have impacted all class 
members.”98 
But Dr. Ordover disputed Dr. Beyer’s finding that hydrogen perox-
ide is fungible and argued that an individualized assessment of the im-
pact on an alleged conspiracy was required.99  Moreover, Dr. Ordover 
presented evidence that common proof was not available to all class 
members and claimed that Dr. Beyer only “promised” to overcome the 
obstacle of explaining common proof without showing or even suggest-
ing how such method might be proved.100 
For the second contested issue regarding proof of damages, 
Dr. Beyer identified two “potential approaches” for estimating damages 
on a class-wide basis: benchmark and regression analyses.101  Dr. Beyer 
did not take into account individual transaction prices in either approach 
but relied instead on list-price-increase announcements and average pric-
es.102  He contended that either method “could be used to estimate the 
prices plaintiffs would have faced but for the conspiracy” and that “suffi-
cient reliable data” existed to allow the completion of one or both of the 
potential approaches.103  Finally, Dr. Beyer generally stated that the 
benchmark analysis and the regression analysis were two approaches that 
could be used to provide an estimate of damages if the suit was certified 
                                                 
 94. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 312.  This means “producers compete[d] on price, not 
quality or other features.”  Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 312–13. 
 97. Id. at 313. 
 98. Id.  Dr. Beyer claimed that this pricing structure existed because prices across producers, 
grades, concentrations, and end uses “moved similarly over time.”  Id. 
 99. Id. at 313–14.  Dr. Ordover claimed that the various grades had different supply characte-
ristics and, thus, different demand requirements.  Id. at 313. 
 100. Id. at 314. 
 101. Id. at 313. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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as a class action, but he did not provide any particular formula or process 
to prove common impact in the instant case.104 
In response, Dr. Ordover asserted that the statistical methods 
Dr. Beyer proposed to demonstrate common impact and damages were 
not feasible; rather, a case-by-case inquiry was needed to determine price 
fluctuations for any class member.105  In addition to presenting Dr. Or-
dover’s testimony, the defendants moved to exclude the affidavit and 
testimony of Dr. Beyer as unreliable under Daubert.106  Because the 
plaintiffs’ analysis of FRCP 23(b) factors depended largely on Dr. Bey-
er’s affidavit, the district court had to first resolve the motion to exclude 
the testimony, as well as the “irreconcilable” expert analyses presented 
by the parties.107  After consideration, the district court ultimately denied 
the defendants’ motion.108 
2.  Summary of the District Court’s Reasoning 
The district court based its reasoning on two underlying considera-
tions: the preponderance of the evidence and the credibility of experts.  
First, the district court found the predominance requirement was satisfied 
because the plaintiffs’ “market analysis” and “pricing structure” analysis 
were sufficiently independent, and the plaintiffs were not required to 
produce any further evidence in support of a motion for class certifica-
tion.109  In finding that the predominance requirement was met, the dis-
trict court permitted the plaintiffs to use common, as opposed to indivi-
dualized, evidence to prove antitrust impact at trial.110 
Next, in consideration of the defendants’ Daubert motion to ex-
clude Dr. Beyer’s testimony, the district court noted that the evidence 
was being offered for the limited purpose of class certification; therefore, 
the court’s “inquiry is perhaps less exacting than it might be for evi-
dence . . . presented at trial.”111  The district court found, rather narrowly, 
                                                 
 104. Id. at 314. 
 105. Id. Dr. Ordover disputed Dr. Beyer’s price-structuring analysis and presented further 
evidence that list prices were not reliable and that the use of average prices by Dr. Beyer did not 
reflect average customer prices.  Additionally, Dr. Ordover asserted that there was a tendency for 
prices charged to individuals to move together, which indicated that the alleged conspiracy could not 
be shown to have a class-wide impact.  Id. 
 106. Id. at 314–15. 
 107. Id. at 315; In re Hydrogen, 240 F.R.D. 163, 170 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 108. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 315. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  Additionally, the district court concluded that hydrogen peroxide is fungible and 
rejected the defendants’ objections to this finding of fungibility.  Id. 
 111. In re Hydrogen, 240 F.R.D. at 170.  The district court continued: “To preclude such evi-
dence at the class certification stage, it must be shown that the opinion is the kind of ‘junk science’ 
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that Dr. Beyer’s qualifications met the two evidence requirements: the 
witness possessed “specialized knowledge” and demonstrated “reliability 
and fit.”112 
The court also found that the plaintiffs’ proposed methods were suf-
ficient for proving impact and damages.113  Although Dr. Beyer did not 
complete any specific analysis, the district court allowed his use of gen-
eral analyses at the precertification stage.114  The district court rejected 
the defendants’ attack on the reliability of Dr. Beyer’s methods, while 
acknowledging that the defendants’ own expert reached a different con-
clusion.115  Moreover, the district court refused to require the plaintiffs to 
demonstrate that either of their proposed methods would work at the 
class certification stage; rather, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ 
intention to prove a significant portion of their case through factual evi-
dence and legal arguments common to all class members was suffi-
cient.116 
Finally, the district court refused to “weigh the relative credibility 
of the parties’ experts” because requiring the court to choose between 
opinions of battling experts would take a vital piece of fact-finding away 
from the jury.117  But the court then stated that at the precertification 
stage of the suit, it was not concerned with whether it found the plain-
tiffs’ evidence convincing because the persuasiveness of the evidence 
was a question for the jury.118  The court reasoned that the plaintiffs 
“need only make a threshold showing that the element of impact will 
predominantly involve generalized issues of proof, rather than questions 
which are particular to each member of the class.”119  By relying on 
plaintiffs’ intentions to prove their claims with generalized expert testi-
                                                                                                             
that a Daubert inquiry at this preliminary stage ought to screen.”  Id. (quoting In re Linerboard Anti-
trust Litig., 203 F.R.D. 197, 217 n.13 (E.D. Pa. 2001)). 
 112. Id. at 170–71.  “Reliability is a question of whether the ‘opinion is based on valid reason-
ing and reliable methodology.’”  Id. at 171 (quoting Kannankeril v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 128 F.3d 
802, 806 (3d Cir. 1997)). “The question of fit requires us to assess the Rule 702 requirement that ‘the 
expert’s testimony must be relevant for the purposes of the case and must assist the trier of fact.’” Id. 
(quoting Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
 113. Id. at 175. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 171.  The defendants specifically attacked Dr. Beyer’s methods to reveal an indus-
try-wide pricing structure.  Id. 
 116. Id. at 170. 
 117. Id. at 171.  The court believed that “plaintiffs would be able to show antitrust impact on 
all purchasers merely by showing that defendants kept list prices that were artificially high because 
of their conspiracy.”  Id. at 174. 
 118. Id. at 174 n.16. 
 119. Id. at 174 (quoting Lumco Indus., Inc. v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 171 F.R.D. 168, 174 (E.D. Pa. 
1997)).  Moreover, the court did not address the defendants’ expert’s reports in determining whether 
the FRCP 23 requirements were met.  Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d 305, 322 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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mony, the court fell short of undergoing the rigorous analysis required to 
determine whether the plaintiffs’ claims could be collectively adjudi-
cated.  The district court then went on to grant the plaintiffs’ motion to 
certify the suit as a class action.120 
B.  The Third Circuit’s Rigorous Analysis for Class Certification 
On appeal of the district court’s determination to certify the class, 
the In re Hydrogen defendants claimed that the district court applied too 
lenient of a standard of proof, failed to consider the defendants’ expert 
with any significant weight, and applied an erroneous presumption of 
antitrust impact.121  Specifically, the defendants contended that the dis-
trict court erred “by (1) accepting only a ‘threshold showing’ by plain-
tiffs, . . . (2) requiring only that plaintiffs demonstrate their ‘intention’ to 
prove impact on a class-wide basis, and (3) singling out antitrust actions 
as appropriate for class treatment even when compliance with [FRCP] 23 
is ‘in doubt.’”122 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted 
review to consider “the standards a district court applies when deciding 
whether to certify a class” under FRCP 23.123  Ultimately, the Third Cir-
cuit found the district court erred in two ways: (1) it failed to meaning-
fully consider the views of the defendants’ expert while crediting the 
plaintiffs’ expert, and (2) it applied too lenient of a standard of proof for 
class certification.124  The Third Circuit then explained that a lower court 
“must make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary [to] con-
sider all relevant evidence and arguments presented by the parties.”125  
The court noted that the party seeking certification must convince a dis-
trict court that the FRCP 23 requirements are met, but it also acknowl-
edged that little guidance is available on the “proper standard of ‘proof’ 
for class certification.”126 
The Third Circuit clarified “three key aspects” for district courts to 
apply when considering class certification motions.127  First, a district 
court is obligated to consider all relevant evidence and arguments, which 
includes expert testimony offered by either the party seeking or opposing 
                                                 
 120. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 322. 
 121. Id. at 312. 
 122. Id. at 315. 
 123. Id. at 307. 
 124. Id. at 321–22. 
 125. Id. at 307. 
 126. Id. at 315–16.  The Third Circuit reiterated the well-established rule that a class may not 
be certified without a finding that each FRCP 23 requirement is met.  Id. at 310. 
 127. Id. at 307. 
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class certification.128  Therefore, a district court’s assumption that it is 
not permitted to weigh expert opinions presented by the parties is erro-
neous.129  Rather, for class certification, when confronted with expert 
opinions, district courts must undergo the “rigorous analysis” required 
under FRCP 23.130  The Third Circuit then rejected the Daubert standard 
as the sole standard for an expert opinion when determining if class certi-
fication is appropriate.131  In addition to applying the Daubert standard, 
the district court must be persuaded by the expert opinion, regardless of 
whether that inquiry implicates the expert’s credibility.132  The Third 
Circuit noted that “[w]eighing conflicting expert testimony at the [class] 
certification stage is not only permissible [but] it may be integral to the 
rigorous analysis [FRCP] 23 demands.”133 
Second, the Third Circuit concluded that “the district court must 
find that the evidence more likely than not establishes each fact neces-
sary to meet the requirements of [FRCP] 23.”134  The Third Circuit em-
phasized that the FRCP 23 requirements are not “mere pleading rules.”135  
A district court must “delve beyond the pleadings to determine whether 
the requirements for class certification are satisfied.”136  A “threshold 
showing” by the party seeking class certification is “inadequate”; such 
factual determinations must be supported by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.137  Under this second requirement, the Third Circuit rejected the 
district court’s holding that the plaintiffs’ intention to prove impact 
through common evidence was sufficient and stated that a party’s “assur-
ance to the court that it intends or plans to meet the [FRCP 23] require-
ments” is insufficient.138 
Third, the Third Circuit held that a district court “must re-
solve . . . legal disputes relevant to class certification, even if [the dis-
putes] overlap with the merits—including [those] touching on elements 
of the cause of action.”139  The Third Circuit’s conclusion stemmed from 
                                                 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 322. 
 130. Id. at 323. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 324. 
 133. Id. at 323.  Interestingly, on appeal, the Third Circuit noted that “Beyer’s and Ordover’s 
analyses are irreconcilable.”  Id. at 314. 
 134. Id. at 320.  In addition, the Third Circuit discouraged the district court’s use of the term 
“threshold showing” because it could imply a more lenient standard for the party seeking certifica-
tion, which the Third Circuit rejected.  Id. at 321. 
 135. Id. at 316 (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 
167 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 320–21. 
 138. Id. at 318. 
 139. Id. at 307. 
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the Supreme Court’s directive in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, which 
provided that there is “nothing in either the language or history of 
[FRCP] 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary in-
quiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be 
maintained as a class action.”140  Yet, the Third Circuit explained that 
“Eisen is best understood to preclude only a merits inquiry that is not 
necessary to determine a [FRCP] 23 requirement.”141  It further explained 
that “overlap between a class certification requirement and the merits of 
a claim is no reason to decline to resolve relevant disputes when neces-
sary to determine whether a class certification requirement is met.”142 
Because the plaintiffs had the burden to demonstrate that the ele-
ment of impact was capable of proof at trial through evidence common to 
the class, the Third Circuit stated that expert testimony “calls for the dis-
trict court’s rigorous assessment of the available evidence and the me-
thod or methods by which plaintiffs propose to use the evidence to prove 
impact at trial.”143  Therefore, a district court “errs as a matter of law” 
when it does not resolve a factual dispute relevant to the FRCP 23 re-
quirements.144 
Hence, by failing to resolve such a factual dispute, district courts 
risk erroneously certifying a class action when class certification may not 
be the best form of adjudication to ensure justice for both parties.  By 
prematurely certifying a class, the court gives the plaintiffs significant 
power over the suit—especially the settlement—which may not result in 
fairness for all parties involved given related concerns about remedies.  
A court, by resolving conflicting information regarding the legal ele-
ments of the plaintiffs’ claim at the precertification stage through a ri-
gorous analysis, ensures protection for the defendants while allowing 
plaintiffs, who could not bring their claims otherwise, access to the 
courts. 
IV.  CIRCUIT SPLITS AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF A 
HIGH RIGOROUS ANALYSIS STANDARD 
The Third Circuit’s decision in In re Hydrogen not only articulates 
the highest rigorous analysis standard for class certification to date but 
also highlights the inconsistency of class certification standards among 
                                                 
 140. Id. at 316–17 (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974)).  Eisen 
involved a class action by odd-lot traders against brokerage firms and the New York Stock Exchange 
for alleged violations of antitrust and securities laws.  Eisen, 417 U.S. at 156. 
 141. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 317. 
 142. Id. at 316. 
 143. Id. at 312. 
 144. Id. at 320. 
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the various circuit courts.  In the last thirty-five years, the Supreme Court 
has decided fewer than a dozen cases involving core class certification 
issues that address the procedural aspects of FRCP 23, expert testimony 
related to the FRCP 23 requirements, and the level of the court’s role in 
determining class certification.  Despite deciding other class action issues 
in various areas of law,145 the Supreme Court has neither expanded upon 
nor provided further clarification regarding its ambiguous statement that 
“[c]lass certification is proper only ‘if the trial court is satisfied, after a 
rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites’ of [FRCP] 23 are met.”146 
The In re Hydrogen decision supports the “growing consensus”147 
that the scope of class certification inquiry is broad and FRCP 23 re-
quires district courts to conduct a rigorous analysis that must include a 
preliminary inquiry of merit issues.148  Yet, while courts may be moving 
away from a lenient standard of review, a clear split regarding the level 
of court involvement exists.  The Supreme Court should resolve the cir-
cuit split in order to curb misuse of class action suits by plaintiffs and to 
protect the interests of defendants.  This section provides an overview of 
relevant circuit court decisions, contrasts the principal case at odds with 
In re Hydrogen, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, and discusses possible implications 
of the Third Circuit’s high rigorous analysis standard. 
A.  Relevant Circuit Court Decisions 
While other circuit courts have attempted to define and strengthen 
the parameters of the rigorous analysis standard, the Third Circuit 
adopted the highest rigorous analysis standard yet for class certification, 
which built upon a prior Second Circuit decision, In re Initial Public Of-
fering Securities Litigation (In re IPO).149  Following the lead of the 
Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Second Circuit 
                                                 
 145. Marcia Coyle, Class Action Fairness Act Achieves Goal, but With a Catch, NAT’L L.J., 
Feb. 13, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202428246880; see also Year-End Update on 
Class Actions, supra note 30 (such areas of law include tax law, ERISA, Title VII, and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act).  For a review of prior Supreme Court decisions, see, for exam-
ple, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (notice to class members); Gulf Oil Co. v. 
Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981) (limits on communication with unnamed members of class); Gen. Tel. 
Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982) (typicality); Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Rich-
mond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984) (res judicata); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) 
(choice of law); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (settlement class actions); 
and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (“limited fund” class actions). 
 146. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 309 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw., 457 U.S. at 
161). 
 147. Klein et al., supra note 11. 
 148. See, e.g., In re IPO, 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2006); West v. Prudential Sec., Inc, 282 F.3d 
935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 149. In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 41. 
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in In re IPO held “that a district court may and, depending on the case, 
must, consider and determine questions relating to the merits of a 
case”150 and rejected the more lenient standard of proof.151 
Prior to In re Hydrogen, In re IPO exemplified the general consen-
sus among circuit courts, which adopted a moderate view of the rigorous 
analysis standard.  The Second Circuit’s view, as consistent with the oth-
er moderate circuits, generally discouraged district courts from turning 
class certification into a “mini-trial” and did not apply the exact prepon-
derance of the evidence standard.152  Yet, the Second Circuit held that 
before certifying a class action, a district court must make a “definitive 
assessment” of the class requirements, and the court’s obligation to 
“make such determinations is not lessened by overlap between a 
[FRCP] 23 requirement and a merits issue.”153  Finally, the Second Cir-
cuit noted that any determination of the FRCP 23 requirements was only 
for purposes of class certification and is not binding on the trier of fact.154  
Although the Second Circuit in In re IPO expanded the district court’s 
role in class certification, it failed to take the final step set forth in In re 
Hydrogen—that a court should not just weigh but also resolve any con-
flicting evidence or expert testimony at the precertification stage. 
1.  Principal Case at Odds: Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
Imagine yourself as the in-house counsel of a growing corporation 
who was just notified that a court certified a class action lawsuit involv-
ing alleged discriminatory practices based on excessive subjectivity by 
various store managers.  While the sheer size of the class and potential 
financial impact on the company are intimidating and quite frightening, 
the suit is ominous for several other reasons.155 
First, the court certified the class based on the plaintiffs’ mere in-
tention to prove the class requirements, despite acknowledgments that 
                                                 
 150. Joel Haims, Matthew D’Amore & Mark David McPherson, United States: Second Circuit 
Decision Clarifies the Standards for Class Certification, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Dec. 15, 2006, 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=45000; see e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco 
Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 
2001); Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 2005); Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 
564 F.3d 1256, 1266 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 151. In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 41.  In In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litigation, 544 F.3d 474, 
484 (2d Cir. 2008), a securities class action, the Second Circuit continued down the path of requiring 
plaintiffs to establish, through evidentiary showings at the class certification stage, that the FRCP 23 
factors are satisfied. 
 152. In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 41. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (Dukes), 474 F.3d 1214, 1222 (9th Cir. 2007).  Note that this 
hypothetical fact pattern is based on Wal-Mart’s current case.  Id. 
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much of the sociology expert’s opinion was conjecture.  Additionally, the 
court’s avoidance in resolving the conflicting expert testimony at the 
precertification stage reduces available litigation strategies.  Once the 
plaintiffs’ class has been certified as a class action, it appears that the 
defendants only have two options: attempt to contest the class certifica-
tion through costly, time-consuming litigation or initiate settlement dis-
cussions.  Defending the class action with the potential for massive fi-
nancial liability, not to mention reputational harm, does not appear to be 
a possibility at this point. 
In reality, the nation’s largest employer currently faces a similar 
situation in Dukes v. Wal-Mart (Dukes), where the Ninth Circuit recently 
affirmed the district court’s decision to certify the class.156  Although a 
district court has broad discretion in certifying a class action, the Dukes 
decision highlights the need for a court’s heightened role in performing a 
rigorous analysis, especially when conflicting expert testimony is pre-
sented.157  Without this rigorous analysis by courts, plaintiffs, such as 
those in Dukes, are given tremendous bargaining power at the certifica-
tion stage whether or not the legal elements of their claims have been or 
may be satisfied if the suit continues. 
Not all courts have followed the trend toward applying a high ri-
gorous analysis standard for class certification.158  Dukes is an example 
of a court confusing the merits of the case as applied to the facts versus 
determining the procedural FRCP 23 elements needed for the plaintiffs’ 
claim as part of the court’s rigorous analysis.  The Dukes court allowed 
the largest class action case in history to proceed without any resolution 
of the highly conflicting expert testimony on whether the FRCP 23 re-
quirements had been satisfied. 
In Dukes, six female employees who were allegedly subjected to 
Wal-Mart’s systematic discriminatory pay and promotion policies 
brought suit under Title VII on behalf of all other similarly situated 
women at Wal-Mart.159  The district court in Dukes, as affirmed by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, permitted class cer-
tification based on the plaintiffs’ intention to prove their claims, without 
                                                 
 156. Wal-Mart recently filed a petition for certiorari on August 25, 2010.  Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3128 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 
10-277).  According to the Supreme Court’s online docket for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, Case 
No. 10-277, the plaintiffs’ response to Wal-Mart’s petition was due on September 24, 2010. 
 157. See Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1214. 
 158. Id. at 1222–23; Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 628 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 159. Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1222.  The potential class is composed of as many as 1.5 million 
women currently or formerly employed by Wal-Mart in its 3,400 stores in 41 regions of the United 
States.  Id. 
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requiring the plaintiffs to actually prove their claims.  Additionally, the 
court failed to examine or resolve the conflicting expert testimony.160 
The class in Dukes was certified pursuant to FRCP 23 because the 
court found that questions of law or fact common to the class members 
predominated over any questions involving only individual members.161  
Both parties appealed but for different reasons.162  Specifically, Wal-
Mart, the largest private employer in the United States, argued that the 
plaintiffs’ evidence—expert opinions, statistical evidence, and anecdotal 
evidence—was not sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination.163  
Further, Wal-Mart contended that because of the subjective decision 
making of managers regarding pay and promotions, the district court’s 
finding of commonality could not be supported.164 
In a two-to-one decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the class certi-
fication, resulting in the largest gender-discrimination case in United 
States history.165  The appellate court found that the district court acted 
within its broad discretion by properly considering expert opinions from 
the plaintiffs’ sociologist and statistician that were offered to show com-
monality.166  While other circuits have not typically approved social 
science testimony, the Ninth Circuit permitted the sociological expert’s 
testimony by stating that the expert had a “reliable basis” to satisfy Dau-
bert.167  The court then accepted the opinions of the plaintiffs’ sociology 
expert despite acknowledging the opinions lacked certainty.  The Ninth 
Circuit further reasoned that “social science statistics may add probative 
value to plaintiffs’ class action claims.”168 
The Ninth Circuit rejected Wal-Mart’s assertion that the plaintiffs’ 
sociological expert did not meet the necessary standards for experts un-
der Daubert.  Instead, the Ninth Circuit adopted the district court’s rea-
soning that the “necessary standards” argument went to the weight of the 
expert opinion, not its admissibility.169  The Ninth Circuit also rejected 
                                                 
 160. Id. at 1222–23. 
 161. Id. at 1231.  The district court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion for 
class certification.  In response to Wal-Mart’s challenges to the evidence, the court responded that 
the “objections are predominantly of the type that go to the weight of the evidence, and thus should 
properly be addressed by a jury considering the merits.”  Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 
137, 166 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 162. Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1223.  The content of the plaintiffs’ appeal is outside the scope of this 
Comment. 
 163. Id. at 1222–33.  While Wal-Mart did not contest the numerosity requirement, it did chal-
lenge the remaining requirements of commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.  Id. 
 164. Id. at 1231. 
 165. Id. at 1244. 
 166. Id. at 1231. 
 167. Id. at 1227. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
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Wal-Mart’s claims that the district court should have taken into account 
Wal-Mart’s statistical expert testimony and found that the employees 
exceeded the permissive and minimal burden of establishing commonali-
ty through significant evidence.170  The Dukes decision emphasized a 
court’s lenient and limited role by stating that the weight of evidence, 
like the merits of the claims, were not to be considered at the class certi-
fication stage.171  Plainly, the Dukes decision is in direct conflict with the 
In re Hydrogen decision and fails to follow the general trend of circuit 
courts that support at least some form of examination into the weight of 
evidence offered at the precertification stage. 
2.  Dissent in Dukes v. Wal-Mart: Class Certification Improper 
Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld’s dissenting opinion in Dukes, from the 
two-judge majority opinion, is more consistent with the Second and 
Third Circuit views adopting a court’s increased role in the precertifica-
tion process.  Judge Kleinfeld believed that the plaintiffs failed to meet 
the FRCP 23 requirements; thus, class certification was improper.172  In 
arguing that class certification in this case would harm both parties in the 
lawsuit, Judge Kleinfeld commented that he would require the district 
court to conduct a more in-depth analysis of the evidence to ensure that 
the FRCP 23 requirements are met.173  In doing so, a district court judge 
“must make a ‘definitive assessment of [the FRCP] 23 requirements, 
notwithstanding their overlap with merit issues’ and ‘must receive 
enough evidence . . . to be satisfied that each [FRCP] 23 requirement has 
been met.’”174 
In addition to disputing the majority’s finding of commonality, 
Judge Kleinfeld disagreed with the majority’s finding on damages.175  
The district court had rejected Wal-Mart’s objections to permitting an 
inference that it engaged in discriminatory practices based on the plain-
                                                 
 170. Id. at 1229–30.  The court found the plaintiffs’ statistical expert report (examined data at a 
regional level) to be more probative than Wal-Mart’s statistical expert (examined data on a store-
department level).  Id. at 1229, 1231.  The evidence provided by both parties focused on company-
wide corporate practices and policies, statistical evidence of gender disparities caused by discrimina-
tion, and anecdotal evidence of gender bias.  Id. at 1225–31. 
 171. Id. at 1227. 
 172. Id. at 1244 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. at 1245.  Judge Kleinfeld commented that both parties would be harmed by violating 
the rights of the women injured and by violating Wal-Mart’s constitutional due process rights.  Id. at 
1244. 
 174. Id. at 1245 (quoting In re IPO, 471 F.3d 24, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 175. Id. at 1248.  Judge Kleinfeld concluded that there were no “questions of law or fact com-
mon to the class” and that the “class lacked ‘typicality’ because the claims or defenses of the repre-
sentative parties [were] not typical of the claims or defenses of the class.”  Id. at 1245–46 (quoting 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)–(3)). 
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tiffs’ evidence.176  In permitting such an inference, the district court be-
lieved the information went to the weight of the evidence, rather than the 
validity; thus, the evidence should be addressed by a jury at the merit 
phase of the case.177 
While the Dukes decision is deeply concerning to both defendants’ 
counsel and various circuit courts, it appears the Ninth Circuit also rec-
ognized the significant impact of the case when later granting Wal-
Mart’s petition for rehearing.  After the Ninth Circuit three-judge panel 
affirmed the district court’s determination to certify the class on February 
6, 2007,178 Wal-Mart promptly filed for a rehearing en banc, contending 
that the majority committed legal error with regard to whether the 
grounds for class action certification had been met.179  On December 11, 
2007, the same Ninth Circuit panel withdrew its initial opinion and is-
sued a subsequent, superseding opinion that still permitted the class certi-
fication.180  Wal-Mart again filed for a rehearing en banc.181  Subsequent-
ly, on February 13, 2009, the Ninth Circuit again granted Wal-Mart’s 
petition for a rehearing en banc on the issue of class action certifica-
tion.182 
B.  Ninth Circuit Upholds Certification of the Largest Nationwide Class 
in Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
On April 26, 2010, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion by certifying a class of approximately 1.5 million 
female Wal-Mart employees.183  In the 6–5 en banc ruling, the court of 
appeals affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part, the class 
certification order.184  “[T]he Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district 
court’s ruling that, although enormous, the class was nonetheless mana-
geable for trial, and that certification did not violate Wal-Mart’s statutory 
                                                 
 176. Id. at 1225 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 1222, withdrawn and superseded by 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 179. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (Dukes II), 509 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 180. Id.  The panel dismissed the original petition for rehearing in light of its superseding opi-
nion on the grounds that the revised opinion addresses the legal errors claimed in the petition.  
Among other changes, the Ninth Circuit altered its original opinion regarding admissibility of expert 
testimony and the use of Daubert challenges during a motion for class certification.  Id. at 1178–80. 
 181. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 556 F.3d 919, 919 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 182. Id.  As a result, the Ninth Circuit’s December 2007 opinion was no longer effective. 
 183. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. (Dukes III), 603 F.3d 571, 615 (9th Cir. 2010).  The class 
potentially includes all female employees who were employed by Wal-Mart when the lawsuit was 
filed in 2001 with respect to their claims for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and back pay result-
ing from allegations of gender discrimination.  Id. at 577. 
 184. Id.  While the discussion of the appellate court’s finding related to damages is outside the 
scope of this Comment, the court reversed and remanded the district court’s certification of the em-
ployees’ claims for punitive damages.  Id. 
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and due process right to defend against each individual claim of discrim-
ination.”185 
Circuit Judge Sandra Ikuta, joined by four other judges including 
Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, authored the dissent, which emphasized the 
divided court.186  The dissenting opinion begins with the following 
statement: 
No court has ever certified a class like this, until now.  And with 
good reason.  In this case, six women who have worked in thirteen 
of Wal-Mart’s 3,400 stores seek to represent every woman who has 
worked in those stores over the course of the last decade—a class 
estimated in 2001 to include more than 1.5 million women.187 
The dissent asserted that the district court abused its discretion in two 
ways: (1) “it failed to follow the Supreme Court’s direction to ‘evaluate 
carefully the legitimacy of the named plaintiff’s plea that he is a proper 
class representative under 23(a),’ and to ensure ‘after a rigorous analysis’ 
that the prerequisites of [FRCP] 23(a) have been met”188 and (2) “it erred 
in ignoring Wal-Mart’s statutory right to raise defenses to liability for 
back pay and punitive damages under Title VII . . . and therefore abused 
its discretion in holding that the proposed class could be certified under 
[FRCP] 23(b)(2).”189 
The dissent stated that the plaintiffs failed to present “significant 
proof” of a discriminatory practice or policy that Wal-Mart engaged in, 
which would make it possible for such a large class of female employees 
to have suffered similar discrimination.190  The dissent expressed concern 
about the majority’s conclusion that courts are not bound by Falcon’s 
“significant proof” requirement.  The dissent stated that, although the 
plaintiffs are not required to prove the merits of their claim, Falcon does 
require the plaintiffs to put forth some significant proof more than mere 
allegations that a general policy of discrimination exists.191  Thus, the 
dissent would require more from plaintiffs before a class of that size is 
certified.192 
Additionally, the dissent favorably cited In re Hydrogen to support 
its argument that the Daubert standard for testimony is to be similarly 
                                                 
 185. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores: En Banc Ninth Circuit Drastically Lowers the Bar for Class 
Certification, MAYER BROWN LEGAL UPDATE, May 3, 2010, at 2, available at 
http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=8939. 
 186. Dukes III, 603 F.3d at 628 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 631 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982)). 
 189. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 190. Id. at 628; see Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982). 
 191. Dukes III, 603 F.3d at 632; see also Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw., 457 U.S. at 159 n.15. 
 192. Dukes III, 603 F.3d at 634. 
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applied to both class certification as well as expert testimony relevant at 
trial: “Expert opinion with respect to class certification, like any matter 
relevant to a [FRCP] 23 requirement, calls for rigorous analysis.”193 
Wal-Mart’s lead appellate counsel, Theodore Boutros, Jr., indicated 
that Wal-Mart would appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court and stated that 
the decision violates “both due process and federal class action rules, 
contradicting numerous decisions of other federal appellate courts and 
the Supreme Court itself.”194  Subsequently, Wal-Mart filed a petition for 
certiorari to the Supreme Court.  On December 6, 2010, the Supreme 
Court granted the writ of certiorari and directed the parties to argue 
whether the class certification ordered under FRCP 23(b)(2) was consis-
tent with FRCP 23(a).195  As in other stages of this litigation, it is likely 
that amicus briefs will be filed on behalf of both parties to represent the 
wide variety of interests and areas that are affected by this decision, such 
as other employers with stores across the country. 
C.  Possible Implications of a Clearly Defined Rigorous Standard 
The clearly-articulated rigorous analysis standard for class certifica-
tion by the Third Circuit in In re Hydrogen has the potential for many 
wide-ranging effects in the world of class action litigation.  The Third 
Circuit opinion makes clear that its holding applies across all substantive 
areas of the law and is not limited solely to antitrust actions.196  There-
fore, the Third Circuit’s decision will affect class action trial strategy for 
both plaintiffs and defendants.  Although the Third Circuit’s rigorous 
analysis standard appears beneficial to defendants, the effects of this 
holding are offset by certain advantages to plaintiffs. 
In “many cases, once a class has been certified[,] the defendant 
must settle, while[,] if no class is certified, the plaintiff [may have] nei-
ther the incentive nor the practical ability to maintain the lawsuit.”197  
                                                 
 193. Id. at 639 (quoting Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d 305, 323 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
 194. Tresa Baldas, Wal-Mart Yells ‘Supreme Court’ after 9th Circuit Certifies Largest Civil 
Class Action Ever, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 26, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=12
02453222347&WalMart_yells_Supreme_Court_after_th_Circuit_certifies_largest_civil_class_actio
n_ever&hbxlogin=1.  Wal-Mart filed a petition for certiorari on August 25, 2010, No. 10-277, with 
the following questions for the Court: (1) whether claims for monetary relief can be certified under 
FRCP 23(b)(2) and, if so, under what circumstances and (2) whether the lower court’s order certify-
ing a class conforms to the requirements of Title VII, the Due Process Clause, the Seventh Amend-
ment, the Rules Enabling Act, and FRCP 23?  Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Pending Petition, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/wal-mart-v-dukes (last visited Nov. 7, 2010). 
 195. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 
3128 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-277). 
 196. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d 305, 321 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 197. Donald M. Falk & Fatima Goss Graves, Federal Court Ruling Undermines Defendants’ 
Ability to Appeal Class Action Certifications, 20 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (2005). 
2011] Rigorous Analysis for Class Action Certification 603 
Therefore, if a trial court fails to resolve conflicting testimony as estab-
lished by the Third Circuit, plaintiffs who present expert testimony with 
only the “intent” to prove the FRCP 23 requirements will have an unfair, 
highly influential advantage over defendants.  Before the Third Circuit’s 
decision, plaintiffs may have sought to bring their motion for class certi-
fication—the defining moment of the case—early on in the litigation, 
thereby prematurely sounding the “death knell of the litiga-
tion[,] . . . irrespective of the merits of the claims.”198  Plaintiffs who pre-
vail on the issue of class certification can often force defendants into a 
strategic settlement rather than risk the potential exposure of facing a 
jury. 
Once a class action is certified, a defendant may not be able to 
present individual defenses and, instead, may wage a statistical war with 
the other side—the outcome of which will be decided by jurors who lack 
the statistical acumen to understand the statistical nuances.199  Without a 
clearly-defined rigorous analysis standard, courts may permit hundreds 
or even millions of plaintiffs (such as in Dukes) to join class action suits 
without giving defendants the opportunity to address individual claims 
on the merits, which is akin to denying the defendants due process.200  
Such class actions are really no more than “corporate shakedowns” with 
the companies’ employees and stockholders, and everyone as consumers 
paying the price.201  As a result, the Third Circuit provides an appropriate 
balance between preserving the plaintiffs’ rights to bring class action 
suits to seek redress and protecting defendants from frivolous class ac-
tions. 
Although the issue of damages is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment, some courts have questioned whether the plaintiffs would ade-
quately represent the interests of the class by foregoing class certification 
on damages.202  Additionally, violations of the defendants’ due process 
rights may occur if money is taken from the defendants and given to un-
deserving individuals, such as uninjured class action members.  Certain 
damages calculations, such as punitive damages, are determined without 
consideration of individual entitlement.  Such a calculation should be 
                                                 
 198. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 310 (citations omitted) (quoting Newton v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162, 167 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 199. Jim Copland, These Actions Have No Class, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POL’Y RES., Sept. 
15, 2004, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/_sfe-these_actions.htm. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 582–83 (7th ed. 2009) (“[E]ven assuming that the district court could conduct an initial 
bench trial on the merits of the equitable claims, and that the court actually found in favor of the 
plaintiffs, it would still be necessary for a single jury to hear and rule on more than 2000 individual 
claims for compensatory damages.” (quoting Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 722 (11th Cir. 2004))). 
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proportionate to actual personal damages; however, when a case has 
been certified as a class action, the court is unaware of personal damages 
in the absence of individual determination.203  Conversely, formulas for 
damages can also hurt the plaintiffs if uninjured individuals not entitled 
to compensation are awarded damages.  Often these undeserving plain-
tiffs are lumped into the class action without individual determinations 
and, as a result, the parties truly injured by the defendant are awarded 
less in damages. 
Accordingly, litigating merit issues at the precertification stage car-
ries with it risks and strategic implications for both defendants and plain-
tiffs.204  Although a district court must decide only those “merit issues 
necessary to deciding class certification, in practice, rulings against de-
fendants on disputed merits issues at the class certification stage may 
nonetheless negatively slant the court on such issues going forward in a 
case.”205  Further, under this clearly-defined rigorous analysis standard, 
plaintiffs may be reluctant to file a motion for class certification earlier in 
the process because they must produce expert evidence that satisfies the 
burden of proof under the FRCP 23 requirements.  Requiring plaintiffs to 
prove more of their case at the precertification stage limits their access to 
the judicial system; however, plaintiffs must prove these necessary ele-
ments later in the suit in order to succeed.  Therefore, the rigorous analy-
sis standard requires the plaintiff to prove the FRCP 23 requirements at 
an earlier stage of the case, and it does not place any undue burden on the 
plaintiff that is not currently required. 
While the Third Circuit’s rigorous analysis standard appears to be 
beneficial to defendants, the increased discovery prior to class certifica-
tion may outweigh the benefits of a more involved court.  The Third Cir-
cuit’s standard is advantageous for defendants because plaintiffs must 
persuade the court that their expert’s opinion satisfies FRCP 23, rather 
than put forward a competent expert that merely passes the Daubert or 
“not fatally flawed” standard.206  This practice of requiring more evi-
dence at an early stage is appropriate given the considerable effect that a 
class certification has on a case; thus, a court should be able to require 
more from the plaintiff at the precertification stage to prove that all the 
FRCP 23 requirements have been met.  In re Hydrogen strongly favors 
an early and aggressive defense strategy designed to marshal compelling 
                                                 
 203. Id. (discussing Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
 204. See id. at 574–75, 580–82. 
 205. Cooley Godward Kronish, L.L.P., Third Circuit Clarifies the “Rigorous Analysis” In-
quiry District Courts Are to Conduct in Deciding Motions for Class Certification, COOLEY ALERT!, 
Feb. 2009, http://www.cooley.com/files/ALERT_ClassCertRigAnalysis.pdf. 
 206. Klein et al., supra note 11. 
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fact and expert testimony that demonstrates the FRCP 23 factors cannot 
be met.207 
Also, the Third Circuit’s rigorous analysis standard gives district 
courts greater discretion to resolve factual issues at the precertification 
stage of the case.  This greater discretion may result in more extensive 
prediscovery and pretrial evidentiary hearings in order for the court to 
have all the information necessary to make a decision on the FRCP 23 
requirements.  Thus, district courts are reluctant to make a determination 
based solely on motion papers.  But if the district court is given greater 
latitude to resolve conflicting expert testimony by utilizing other tools, 
such as discovery, to resolve any conflicting reports, then the potential 
for premature class certification can be reduced.208  Given the broad in-
quiry required by courts under such an approach, it may be difficult for 
defendants to limit class discovery at an early stage in the case.  Yet, 
even with these increased discovery costs, ultimately, it is cost effective 
for a defendant to contest class certification early rather than fight for a 
class action to be decertified and be unsuccessful. 
Finally, In re Hydrogen is likely to influence the Supreme Court 
because the majority opinion was authored by Chief Judge Anthony J. 
Scirica,209 who is a leading figure in civil procedure and oversaw exten-
sive revisions to FRCP 23 during his role as chair of the Standing Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.  In his decision, Chief Judge 
Scirica relied on the 2003 Amendments to FRCP 23.210  The 2003 
amendments eliminated the previous language that class certification 
“may be conditional” and granted on a tentative basis.211  The revised 
language now provides for a more thorough evaluation of the FRCP 23 
requirements at this earlier stage and the revisions clarified that FRCP 23 
neither requires nor encourages premature certification decisions.212  
These revisions are also consistent with the Advisory Committee Notes 
to the 2003 amendments, which state that “[a]ctive judicial supervision 
may be required to achieve the most effective balance that expedites an 
informed certification determination without forcing an artificial and ul-
                                                 
 207. Year-End Update on Class Actions, supra note 30. 
 208. Jeffrey J. Greenbaum & Stuart M. Feinblatt, Hydrogen Peroxide: The Third Circuit’s 
‘Acid Test’ for Class Certification, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS. 52 (Apr. 2009). 
 209. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d 305, 306 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Klein et al., supra note 
11. 
 210. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 318–20; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s 
notes on 2003 amendments. 
 211. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 319. 
 212. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes on 2003 amendments. 
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timately wasteful division between ‘certification discovery’ and ‘merits 
discovery.’”213 
Although the Third Circuit’s approach in In re Hydrogen requires 
district courts to apply the highest rigorous analysis standard for class 
certification, the potential effects from its decision have not been fully 
realized.  It is possible that courts may opt for a somewhat less rigorous 
standard, like that established in In re IPO, which appears to strike a 
middle ground between In re Hydrogen and Dukes.  Yet it seems unlike-
ly that future district courts will follow the reasoning in Dukes by allow-
ing certification on mere intent to prove a case based on questionable 
expert testimony, which is “replete with conjecture.”214  Which standard 
will be the leading view remains to be seen given the recent Ninth Cir-
cuit decision affirming class certification. 
V.  THE NEED FOR SUPREME COURT INVOLVEMENT AND CLARIFICATION 
The Supreme Court should adopt the Third Circuit’s high rigorous 
analysis standard in order to curb misuse of class actions and ensure fair-
ness for all injured plaintiffs.  Rigorous analysis must include a prelimi-
nary inquiry into and the resolution of the issues to determine that the 
FRCP 23 requirements have been met before certifying a class.215  The 
need for a clearly defined rigorous analysis standard by the Supreme 
Court is long overdue.  Although different courts have articulated various 
versions of what such a “rigorous review” might look like, the Supreme 
Court has not spoken authoritatively on the issue.216 
Regardless of liability, the threat of a class action is enough to force 
many defendants to settle a lawsuit rather than risk a trial.  “As a result, 
the key event and driver of risk and exposure in class actions continues 
to be the court’s decision on whether to certify a class.”217  Class action 
trials are less common given the financial and reputational effects at 
                                                 
 213. Id. 
 214. James J. Oh, Dukes v. Wal-Mart: A Foreboding Class Certification Decision for Employ-
ers, ASAP, July 2004, http://www.littler.com/PressPublications/Documents/11259.pdf. 
 215. At a minimum, the Supreme Court needs to establish clear standards for a rigorous analy-
sis and the level of a court’s involvement in resolving conflicting expert testimony.  While not ideal, 
the Supreme Court may follow the general trend as set forth in In re IPO, which held “that a district 
court may—and, depending on the case, must—consider and determine questions relating to the 
merits of a case” but without actually resolving such questions.  See Haims, D’Amore & McPherson, 
supra note 150. 
 216. Rebecca Justice Lazarus, Discovery Prior to Class Certification: New Considerations and 
Challenges, 9 MEALEY’S LITIG. REPORT CLASS ACTIONS 1, 3 (2010). 
 217. Fourth Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report from Seyfarth Shaw Notes Sig-
nificant Growth in High Stakes Litigation at State Court Levels, SEYFARTH SHAW, L.L.P., PRESS & 
NEWS, Jan. 14, 2008 http://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/news_item/2a69ffe5-df15-475f-a78a-
da0661200731_documentupload.pdf. 
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stake for the defendants.218  “Class actions are [also] the litigation indus-
try’s weapons of choice because they aggregate so many claims—
hundreds, thousands, or (as in the [Dukes] case) even millions—even the 
largest companies are forced to settle or face potential bankruptcy.”219  
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit, in upholding Dukes’s class certification, 
skimmed past the impact of such settlement pressure: “[n]early every 
circuit to consider the issue, including our own, has recognized the prac-
tical importance of the certification decision as leverage for settlement, 
yet [FRCP] 23 gives neither party the right to turn the certification deci-
sion into a trial.”220  Often, the numbers are so large that the merits of the 
case mean little because the expense of litigating the claim and the poten-
tially high verdict in the event of loss can give the plaintiffs’ attorneys a 
very strong hand despite their weak legal position.221  These class action 
settlements and jury awards cost hundreds of millions of dollars—costs 
that must be recovered through higher prices for goods and services, 
which ultimately affect the economy as a whole.222 
The Supreme Court should clarify the standards in class actions to 
avoid certification issues as highlighted in cases like Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 
which potentially deprive victims of the protection of laws and deny de-
fendants their due process rights.223  The district court in Dukes described 
the outcome as “rough justice,” proclaiming that it was “better than the 
alternative of no remedy at all for any class member.”224  But there is a 
better approach—the Third Circuit’s rigorous analysis standard.  Even 
though this standard may result in a suit not being certified as a class ac-
tion, a remedy is still available for actual victims of injury without sacri-
ficing due process for defendants. 
Class actions continue to be a primary exposure, which drives cor-
porate legal expenditures and supports the need for Supreme Court in-
volvement.  In addition, the current struggles in the economy appear to 
fuel class action lawsuits that result in inconsistent rulings due to the lack 
of a clear standard.  Class actions continue to be filed across many subs-
tantive areas of the law.225  Without a clear standard set forth by the Su-
                                                 
 218. Mark Moller, The Anti-Constitutional Culture of Class Action Law, CATO INST., Summer 
2007, at 52. 
 219. Copland, supra note 199. 
 220. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 591 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 221. Copland, supra note 199. 
 222. California Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse (CALA), Class Action Abuse, CALA.COM, 
http://www.cala.com/issues/class-action (last visited Oct. 12, 2010). 
 223. Eric S. Dreiband, Willie Sutton was a Piker, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2006, at A7. 
 224. Id. (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 177 (N.D. Cal. 2004)). 
 225. Year-End Update on Class Actions, supra note 30. 
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preme Court, the varying and sometimes conflicting circuit standards 
will continue. 
Due to the lack of a clearly articulated rigorous analysis standard 
and splits among the circuit courts, attorneys have found other legal ave-
nues to pursue class action issues.  For example, in recent years, the 
Class Action Fairness Act (the Act) has continued to play a significant 
role in class action suits in evolving case law developments, including 
creative plaintiff strategies to prevent the effectiveness of the Act.226  
Moreover, President Barack Obama’s administration adopted a more 
protective view of workers’ rights than the Bush administration, includ-
ing increased funding for several government and enforcement agencies, 
which could directly affect the future of class action suits because these 
agencies are able to bring suits on behalf of injured parties.227 
The stakes of class action litigation can be significant and the fi-
nancial risks enormous.  When certified as class actions based on a le-
nient rigorous analysis standard, the result is an unfair advantage to the 
plaintiffs.  The potential for massive settlements (in Dukes for example) 
increases the financial stakes as plaintiffs’ lawyers are likely to push the 
envelope to craft damages theories to expand the size of classes and the 
scope of recoveries.228  Additionally, class actions adversely affect the 
market share of a corporation and its reputation in the marketplace.229  
Even if cases are never actually certified, the possibility of the litigation 
expanding into a formal class action raises the stakes significantly, per-
haps requiring a more aggressive defense or resulting in a settlement on 
an individual basis at a premium.230  Not only for judicial efficiency rea-
sons, but also for economic reasons, the Supreme Court’s immediate in-
volvement is needed, and a clear standard has been established by the 
Third Circuit that can and should be adopted.  The Third Circuit’s rigor-
ous analysis standard is an appropriate balance between providing plain-
tiffs access to the judicial system to seek redress and providing appropri-
ate protections to defendants against unsupported class action motions. 
Additionally, Supreme Court involvement is necessary because 
class certification decisions can also be “susceptible to two sources of 
                                                 
 226. Coyle, supra note 145.  “While many multi-state cases are being pushed into the federal 
system, the plaintiffs’ bar has responded to CAFA by filing ‘single state’ class suits to avoid 
CAFA’s removal provisions.”  Year-End Update on Class Actions, supra note 30. 
 227. Year-End Update on Class Actions, supra note 30. 
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bias: political bias and bias that stems from [the] courts’ own self-interest 
in docket clearance.”231  First, loose certification standards are “vulnera-
ble to trial judges’ political biases” because they require little of a judge 
in evaluating the merits of the FRCP 23 requirements.232  Additionally, 
some courts, including the Ninth Circuit, discern from FRCP 23’s vague 
text a basis for ignoring Daubert entirely when assessing whether certifi-
cation of a class action is proper based on expert testimony.233  Because 
FRCP 23’s text points in different directions, it invites exploitation by 
judges who would prefer to ignore the Daubert standard entirely.234 
Even if political ideology is not a source of bias, trial courts remain 
at risk of bias in class action suits because they have a material interest in 
promoting certification for one simple reason: certification promotes 
docket clearance.235  Rule 23 “directs that certification decisions should 
be made ‘at an early practicable time’ and, in design, forces certification 
decisions to be made before a trial of the case.”236  “Based on this, a 
number of courts, including the Ninth Circuit panel that decided Dukes, 
have held that consideration of the ‘merits’ is entirely off-limits at the 
class certification stage.”237  “Daubert is a merits-based inquiry because 
it relates to the admissibility of evidence at trial; therefore, these courts 
argue that a full-blown Daubert analysis is premature at the class certifi-
cation stage.”238  Yet the Third Circuit’s articulation of a rigorous analy-
sis requiring plaintiffs to present a preponderance of evidence that the 
FRCP 23 requirements are met would reduce the number of courts that 
apply their own inconsistent standards to expert testimony. 
                                                 
 231. Moller, supra note 218, at 53. 
 232. Id.  For example, a trial judge with a “strong aversion to large corporations might . . . want 
to punish big corporate interests, ‘sending a message’ that they must respect the little 
guy. . . .  Conversely, a pro-business trial judge might want to go out of the way to deny class certifi-
cation of meritorious claims.”  Id. 
 233. Id. at 54. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id.  “Dockets are congested because of the explosion of statutes and because of the mod-
ern rules that govern when legal issues can be litigated more than once (called ‘preclusion’).  The 
explosion of vague, overlapping laws gives plaintiffs many potential vehicles for prosecuting com-
plaints against a defendant. . . .  At the same time, modern rules of ‘preclusion’ apply more strictly to 
defendants than plaintiffs.  A defendant who loses a lawsuit against one plaintiff typically cannot re-
litigate his [or her] failed defenses against a different plaintiff asserting similar claims.”  Id. at 54–
55. 
 236. Id. at 54. 
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 238. Id. Yet this reading is not the only one “because other portions of Rule 23 point in an 
opposite direction. . . . Judge Frank Easterbrook notes, ‘if some of the [other] considerations under 
Rule 23(b)(3), such as “the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action,” 
overlap the merits—as they do . . . where it is not possible to evaluate impending difficulties without 
[a merits-based inquiry]—then the judge must make a preliminary inquiry into the merits.’”  Id. 
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More recently, there appears to be change on the horizon—the 
Ninth Circuit demonstrated a willingness to take a step back in the de-
fense-oriented ruling Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.239  In Vi-
nole, class certification was denied in an action for failure to pay over-
time brought by current and former Countrywide external home loan 
consultants.240  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding, 
which denied class certification where no rule or decisional authority 
prohibited the defendants from filing their motion to deny certification 
before the plaintiffs filed their motion to certify the class.241  A district 
court, the Ninth Circuit noted, “must take into consideration all factors in 
favor of, or against, class certification.”242  Moreover, “the overarching 
focus remains whether trial by class representation would further the 
goals of efficiency and judicial economy.”243  The Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the district court had conducted a proper inquiry into the 
FRCP 23 requirements and did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to 
certify the proposed class.  The decision confirmed that a defendant is 
entitled to bring a motion under FRCP 23 advocating that a class action 
should not be certified.244  The willingness of the Ninth Circuit to affirm 
in favor of defendants is important in the class action context because 
this decision is consistent with the idea of a court taking a more involved 
role in the class certification process. 
In summary, the need for Supreme Court involvement and articula-
tion of a rigorous analysis standard is needed.  The Supreme Court 
should adopt the high rigorous analysis standard set forth in In re Hydro-
gen. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Class action certification has gained significant media attention and 
raised widespread debate in light of the recent Dukes v. Wal-Mart and In 
re Hydrogen cases.  While the sheer magnitude of the Dukes certified 
class alone may draw Supreme Court attention, the Court cannot contin-
ue to ignore this issue due to the continued struggle among the lower 
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courts regarding certification standards.  Thus, Supreme Court involve-
ment is necessary to finally and clearly articulate what constitutes a “ri-
gorous analysis.” 
The Third Circuit has defined a standard for a district court’s rigor-
ous analysis that includes a preliminary inquiry and resolution of merit 
issues that are necessary to determine FRCP 23 requirements for class 
certification.  The need for a clear standard is evident from the sheer vo-
lume of class action litigation.  In order to preserve judicial efficiency 
and fairness across jurisdictions, a single, national standard is required.  
The Third Circuit standard strikes the appropriate balance between judi-
cial access for plaintiffs and due process rights of the defendants and 
provides an ideal model standard for the Supreme Court. 
